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An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family
Law Jurisprudence: Application of an
Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective
BARBARA A. BABB*

INTRODUCTION

The task of jurisprudence for legal realists is a practical aim to ensure that
judicial decisionmaking promotes social welfare and increases the predictability
of legal outcomes.' This focus on the functional effects of judicial
decisionmaking requires sufficient knowledge of the social sciences to enable
judges to understand social policy implications when fashioning legal remedies. 2
Legal realism has dominated judicial decisionmaking in most areas of the law
Family law4 jurisprudence, however, reflects the law's inconsistency with
families' real life experiences and with relevant social science research in child
development and family relations Historically, judges have attempted to fashion
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to thank my superb research assistants, Kristin Woolam, Jamie Marthaler, Robert Durocher,
and Francine Krumholz, and summer interns, Melanie Keller and Dian Sujono. Finally, I
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improve the lives of so many.
1. THEODORE M. BEND=Tr, Legal Realism, in LAW AS A RULE AND PRINCIPLE 1-21 (1978),

reprintedin DALE A. NANCE, LAW AND JUSTICE: CASES AND READINGS ON THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 69 (1994).
2. Id at 70.
3. Gary B. Melton & Brian L. Wilcox, Changes in Family Law and Family Life:
Challengesfor Psychology, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1213, 1214 (1989).
4. Family law in this Article means a comprehensive approach to family law subject matter
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction over cases involving divorce, separation, and annulment;
property distribution; child custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity,
adoption, and termination of parental rights; juvenile delinquency; child abuse and child
neglect; domestic violence; criminal non-support; name change; guardianship of minors and
disabled persons; withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures, involuntary
admissions, and emergency evaluations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 §§ 921-928 (1975
& Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 571-11 to 571-14 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., [FAM. LAW]
§ 1-201 (1991 & Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.223 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.J. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:434-8 (West 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-736 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp.
1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie Supp. 1996).
5. Melton & Wilcox, supranote 3, at 1214. Another scholar has critiqued the incoherence
between the social reality of families and family law:
The current incoherence between family reality and the images of family in law
expose the dominant ideology [of the traditional family model] and its role in
policy formation. Refusing to address and to assess the continued viability of
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morality in the determination of family legal issues rather than to devise legal
remedies that accommodate how families live.6 This approach to decisionmaking
must change if family law jurisprudence is to effectuate the well-being of
families and children. A new approach to family law jurisprudence can assist
decisionmakers to account for the realities of families' lives when determining
family legal issues.
The lack of legal realism in family law is troublesome given the extent of court
involvement in the lives of families and children. A recent Wall Street Journal
article has revealed that family law cases constitute about thirty-five percent of
the total number of civil cases handled by the majority of our nation's courts, a
percentage which constitutes "the largest and fastest growing part of the state
civil caseload."7 The focus of judicial decisionmaking in family law needs to
become how the state intervenes in family life, rather than whether the state
ought to intervene,' as court involvement itself constitutes state intervention.
Changes over the last few decades in the structure and function of the
American family, as well as the relative complexity of contemporary family legal
issues, challenge judges to adopt an appropriate jurisprudential philosophy that
addresses these transformations. The tremendous volume and breadth of family
law cases now before the courts, coupled with the critical role of the family in
today's society to provide stable and nurturing environments for family members,
require that judges understand relevant social science research about child
development and family life. This informed perspective can assist
decisionmakers to dispense justice aimed at strengthening and supporting
families.9
This Article proposes an interdisciplinary approach to resolve family legal
proceedings. The interdisciplinary perspective helps judges consider the many
influences on human behavior and family life, thereby resulting in more
pragmatic and helpful solutions to contemporary family legal issues. Part I of the
Article begins with an overview of demographic information about the

ideological assumptions, politicians and pundits resort to condemnation and to
repressive policy suggestions. This pattern of reaction to changing family
behavior should raise questions about the responsive capabilities of our lawmaking institutions.
Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The PoliticalRole of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA.
L. REv. 2181, 2186 (1995).
6. Melton & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 1214; cf Anne C. Dailey, FederalismandFamilies,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1790 (1995) (arguing that state legislatures and courts fashion laws
and decisions in the domestic relations area by reflecting shared or community values about
family life).
7. ST. JUSTICE INST., ST. CT. CASELOAD STAT. ANN. REP. 1992 (Feb. 1994), cited in Amy
Stevens, The Busines of Law: Lawyers and Clients; More Than Just Torts, WALL ST. J., July
1, 1994, at B6; see also Gary B. Melton, Children,Families, and the Courts in the TwentyFirstCentury, 66 S.CAL. L. REv. 1993, 2006-07 (1993) (predicting that family law cases will
increase and are likely to become more difficult).
130 (1989).
9. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Interventionin the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
8. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY

REF. 835, 854-55 (1985) (arguing that courts base their decisions in family law cases on policy
considerations, which decisions thereafter affect the nature of family roles and relationships).
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composition and function of the American family in today's society. It then
reviews the scope of family law adjudication facing today's courts and justifies
the need for decisionmakers to view family legal problems with an expansive
focus. Part II argues for application of a behavioral sciences paradigm, or the
ecology of human development," to provide the social science basis for more
effective and therapeutic jurisprudence" in family law. Demonstrating the
relevance of this theoretical framework to fashion family legal outcomes, a novel
application of social science within the law, makes clear the need to rely on
social science theories and findings in family law adjudication. Part III of the
Article explains how an ecological and therapeutic jurisprudential paradigm
operates when applied to determine family legal matters, as well as how this
interdisciplinary approach differs from traditional notions of adjudication.
I. FAMILY LAW JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTEXT: THE STATE
OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND AMERICAN FAMILY LAW

A. The ChangingNature of the Family
The family justice system increasingly finds itself attempting to respond to
changes in family life. 2 Dramatic changes in the structure of the family have
occurred in the past few decades. These changes have resulted in part from
greater geographic mobility, increased life expectancy, new reproductive
technologies, transformations in women's roles, and declining adherence to
formal religion. 3

10. URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1979).
11. David Wexler defines therapeutic jurisprudence as follows:
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic
agent. It looks at the law as a social force that, like it or not, may produce
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. Such consequences may flow from
substantive rules, legal procedures, or from the behavior of legal actors (lawyers
orjudges).
David B. Wexler, PuttingMental Health into Mental Health Law: TherapeuticJurisprudence,
in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3, 8 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
1991) (footnote omitted).
12. Melton, supranote 7, at 1993-94. It is challenging to define the notion of family:
It is impossible to offer many generalizations or universal statements about the
family that some authority will not challenge. While one expert argues that the
family as a social institution is not only dissolving but has actually become an
anachronism, another applauds its state of health and a third maintains that though
there might be some changes in family structure, eventually it will evolve to a
more viable form. Each position is accompanied by an impressive array of data.
Each conclusion is credible if the reader is willing to accept each authority's
implicit definition of what a family is and what it should be.
ROBERT M. MORONEY, THE FAMILY AND THE STATE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 15

(1976) (footnotes omitted).
13. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 4 (1989).
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An examination of birth rate statistics documents that over the last few decades
children comprise a smaller proportion of today's society, and there are fewer
children per family. 4 From 1950 until 1992, the birth rate for all Americans
declined by one-third, 5 although births to unmarried women increased from five
percent in 196016 to twenty-four percent in 1992.17

Mothers' employment outside the home also has changed dramatically. Married
mothers who work outside the home and who have children between the ages of
six and seventeen years have increased from a rate of thirty-nine percent in 1960
to seventy-five percent in 1993.' The percentage of unmarried mothers
participating in the labor force has increased from sixty-six percent in 1960 to
seventy-eight percent in 1993.'" Among married mothers with children under the
age of six years, labor force participation has increased from about nineteen
percent in 1960 to almost sixty percent in 1993.20 The labor force participation
rates for unmarried mothers with children under six years have increased from
forty-one percent in 1960 to sixty percent in 1993.21
The number of individuals divorcing has quadrupled from 1950 to 1992.22 The
high divorce rate translates to the termination of over one million American
marriages annually, and these divorces disrupt the lives of over three million
men, women, and children. 23 This unparalleled divorce rate has resulted in "a
high remarriage rate and the creation of blended [or reconstituted] families. 24 In

14. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994,
at 64, 75 (114th ed. 1994); see also MARY Jo BANE, HERE TO STAY: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19 (1976).
15. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supranote 14, at 75.
16. Melton, supranote 7, at 1994.
17. AMARA BACHU, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN, JUNE
1992, at xix (1993).
18. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supranote 14, at 402.
19. 1d.
20. Id.; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 8 (1992).
21. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 402.
22.Id. at 75.
23. Id. at 103; see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA

at xvii (1985).
24. Melton, supra note 7, at 1996; see Judith T. Younger, MaritalRegimes: A Story of
Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestionsfor Reform, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 45, 87 (1981). Younger criticizes current divorce law because of the courts'
failure to consider children's welfare in deciding whether to grant or deny the divorce. Id. at
84. She suggests that "[t]he law should require at least an individual determination of how a
divorce will affect minor children; their welfare should bear directly on their parents' rights to
end their marriage." Id. at 90; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational DecisionmakingAbout
Marriageand Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 91 (1990) (arguing for family law to reflect parties'
precommitment to relationships in the areas of marriage and divorce in order to reduce
psychological and economic harm, especially to children).
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addition, the number of unmarried Americans cohabitating has increased from
about eleven million in 1960 to thirty-seven million in 1993.25
Along with changes in the structure of the American family, many of the
functions the family performs for its members also have changed.26 Historically,
the family has served as the locus of emotional, spiritual, financial, and
educational support for its members." The state now performs many of the
functions once performed only by the family?8 For example, the state has become
more involved in matters of education and in caring for the dependent members
of our society through public assistance and social security." This shifting of
family functions to the state has contributed to a new image of the family that
contemporary family law decisionmaking must reflect. Despite the fact that the
state has assumed some functions traditionally performed by the family, however,
the state has not met all of families' needs for social support.30 Some needs, such
as child care for working parents, remain unmet.3
Family roles and relationships also have transformed as the structure of the
family has altered. These changes in family roles and relationships both arise
from and contribute to the redefined functions the family now performs. Family
life has become more complex and demanding. Many families regularly face the

crises and challenges surrounding unemployment, violent crime, drug and
alcohol abuse, spousal and child abuse, and the stress created by competing time
demands.32 The increased mobility of contemporary families often results in a

25. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 14, at 58. Statistics related to family
composition may not provide a complete picture of the reality of family life:
Looking at family reality, however, involves more than just a reference to these
empirical changes. The statistics have normative as well as empirical implications.
The fact that the United States has a multiplicity of ethnic, religious, and cultural
traditions, supports the argument that we should develop a pluralistic social model
inclusive of diverse family practices.
Fineman, supra note 5, at 2189.
26. See David J. Herring, Exploring the PoliticalRoles of the Family:Justificationsfor

Permanency Planningfor Children, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 183, 212-56 (1995) (providing a
comprehensive historical analysis of the political role of the family in American society,
including its responsibility to produce good citizens, to produce socially diverse citizens, to
facilitate the development of associations with others, and to promote tolerance for diversity);
cf Fineman, supra note 5, at 2182 (arguing that continuing to hold certain unrealistic beliefs
about the family negatively affects our ability to resolve social problems of caring for
dependent members of society).
27. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES INPUBLIC POLICY 19 (1977).
28. MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE

at viii (1977).

29. Id. at viii, 1.
30. Melton, supra note 7, at 2000.
31. See Fineman, supra note 5, at 2214 (discussing empirical information regarding how
families respond to caretaking issues and who performs child care for families).
32. See Melton, supra note 7, at 1996-97.
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loss of stability for family members,33 a lack of social support systems, and
increased isolation. 4 Nevertheless, relationships outside the family unit,
including informal social support systems and kinship networks, remain
important for effective family functioning.15 Paradoxically, for many people the
complexity of modem society also results in a retreat to the private institution of
the family for stability? 6
B. ContemporaryFamily Law Issues

Given the changes occurring in the structure and function of the American
family, the family law systems of Western industrial societies began a radical
transformation in the 1960s in the areas of marriage, divorce, support, and
parent-child relationships." Problems of child maltreatment, juvenile
delinquency, family violence, substance abuse, economics, and medical or mental
health issues often began to play a role in and complicate family law cases.3"
Other areas of the law not generally considered family law, such as public
benefits and employment law, increasingly affected families and children. 9 If
these family problems were not challenging enough for the justice system, new
family members and relationships began to emerge before the courts, including
the gestational or surrogate mother (who carries the fetus to term),4" the sperm

33. Id.; see also Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: ChoosingBetween
Parentsin a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAm.L. 791, 795-96 (1992-93) (documenting
recent demographic data and social, psychological, and related consequences to geographic
moves involving families and children, including the fact that over eleven million children in
America change residences annually).
34. Melton, supra note 7, at 1999; see also EXTENDING FAMILIES: THE SoCIAL NETWORKs
OF PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN (Moncrieff Cochran et al. eds., 1990).
35. Moncrieff Cochran & Frank Woolever, Beyond the Deficit Model: The Empowerment
ofParentswith Information andInformal Supports, in CHANGING FAMILIES 225, 227 (Irving
E.Sigel & Luis M. Laosa eds., 1983); see also BANE, supra note 14, at 37, 50.
36. BERGER& NEUHAUS, supra note 27, at 19 (defining the value many people attribute to
the family as follows: "Here [within the context of the family] they make their moral
commitments, invest their emotions, plan for the future, and perhaps even hope for
immortality.").
37. GLENDON, supranote 13, at 1.
38. Melton, supra note 7, at 1997-98, 2028 (discussing the effects of AIDS cases on the
family justice system, including an increased need for foster care and complex dependency
cases); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits andRisks ofPrivatizationofJustice Through
ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 241, 256 (1996) ("Another source of new litigation is
increased sensitivity to social injustice, and the attendant creation of legally enforceable rights
intended to assist the previously disenfranchised ....Once it was established that women have
a right not to be battered, the courts became a natural forum for enforcing those rights.").
39. GLENDON, supra note 28, at 1.
40. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (concluding that the husband and
wife were the natural parents of a child born to a gestational surrogate).
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donor (who remains legally unrelated to the resulting child),4' and the
psychological parent (who may or may not be a biological parent to the child).42
Most family law scholars attribute the skyrocketing divorce rate in the United
States to the change in substantive family law spawned by California's no-fault
divorce statute enacted in 1970, enabling couples to divorce more easily 3 This
change in substantive family law has contributed to refashioning the legal rights
and responsibilities relative to marriage and to creating new behavioral norms for
husbands, wives, and family members.44 The need for court intervention to
accomplish this redefinition of legal rights and responsibilities has resulted in
substantial increases in the volume of family law cases courts must adjudicate
and in radical alterations regarding the substance and breadth of the legal and
social issues involved.45 In addition, the transformation of family law has
occurred so rapidly that our society and our courts continue to address the
challenges presented.46

41. See Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1993) (finding that a
sperm donor was equitably estopped from asserting parental rights). But see Jhordan C. v. Mary
K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming the declaration of the sperm donor
of a child conceived by artificial insemination to be the resulting child's legal father).
42. See Ronald FF v. Cindy GG, 511 N.E.2d 75 (N.Y. 1987) (finding that a nonbiological
or psychological "parent" had no rights to visitation absent the consent of the natural mother).
43. WEirzMAN, supra note 23, at x (noting that by 1980, every state but South Dakota and
Illinois adopted similar legislation). But cf Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender
Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103 (1989) (arguing that the economic circumstances of women and
children following divorce were not better off under the fault-based system). Legislatures in
several states, including Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, and
Virginia, recently proposed initiatives designed to end no-fault divorce due to concern over
high divorce rates and the effects of divorce on children. See Barbara Vobejda, Critics,Seeking
Change, Fault 'No-Fault'DivorceLaws for High Rates, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1996, at A3;
infra note 122.
44. WErZMAN, supra note 23, at xv. Family law has begun to reflect some changes in sexrole behaviors:
The law has abandoned its former express or implicit stereotyping of sex roles
within marriage and has moved toward a new model in which there is no fixed
pattern of role distribution. We have seen a movement ... toward equal sharing
of parental rights and obligations. At the same time, there has been a trend toward
diminution of the rights of both mothers and fathers, as children are increasingly
treated as individuals with rights of their own.
GLENDON, supra note 13, at 102.
45. See Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudenceand the Great, Slumbering
Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64

FORDHAM L. REv. 921 (1995) (discussing legal challenges to define marriage and family in
contemporary American society). Family law continues to present complex challenges:
No-fault divorce, which was once thought to be one of our more significant social
achievements, has paled in significance as we have moved on to such
achievements as children divorcing parents, parents divorcing children, and
increasingly prevalent awards ofjoint and multiple custody, palimony, galimony,
and surrogate parents, in an ever-richer and ever-bubbling family stew.
H. TED RuBN & VicroR E. FLANGO, COURT COORDINATION OF FAMILY CASES 64-65 (1992).
46. WEiTZMAN, supra note 23, at xvii.
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One challenge courts face that requires their increasing regulation47 in family
dissolution cases is determining the economic consequences for family members.
While enactment in all states of child support guidelines has removed
significantly the element ofjudicial discretion in establishing child support and
generally has resulted in higher and more consistent child support awards, 4 the
poor rate of collection of child support from noncustodial parents49 represents a
substantial deprivation to children's lives, as well as an example of a serious
failing of the current court system."0 Another economic decision courts must
make in family dissolution cases is determining whether to grant spousal support
and how to distribute property upon divorce. In these areas, also, the court
system appears to shortchange some of its most vulnerable participants:
The economic consequences to divorce today are the "equitable" division
of property worth too little to matter; no or short-term alimony; child support
that fails to ensure a standard of living for the children and their mother
equivalent to that of the father; outcomes that are inconsistent and often
unpredictable, and that, for women and children, do [not] appear to be getting
better; and economic hardship that often could have been lessened through
more equitable rules.5
The increase in more female-headed households resulting from a greater number
of divorces52 has contributed to the "feminization of poverty,"53 a term describing
most women's significant decline in their standard of living within one year after
divorce, contrasted with their former husbands' improved standard of living. 4
In addition to the complexity of family law cases, family law issues have
become the subject of increased numbers of federal appellate cases" and of

47. See GLENDON, supra note 13, at 2.
48. Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth ofDiscretionaryJustice in Family Law: The Child

SupportExperiment, 70 N.C. L. REv. 209, 238 (1991-92) (arguing that fixed rules in family
law decisionmaking offer greater predictability and benefits to litigants in these cases than does
adjudication involving judicial discretion); see also Margaret Campbell Haynes, Understanding
the Guidelines and the Rules, 16 FAM. ADvOC. no. 2, 1993, at 14, 17; cf Linda Henry Elrod,
The Federalizationof Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 103, 129 (1990)

(finding that, even with application of the child support guidelines, there are substantially
inconsistent amounts of child support awarded under similar factual circumstances depending
upon the normative guidelines amount adopted by a particular state).
49. See Charles Drake & Jan Warner, Support Collection-What'sA Client To Do?, 16

FAM. ADvoc., 1993, no. 2, at 38 (finding that only half of all parents awarded child support
collect the full amounts; whereas, the other half receive only partial payment or nothing); see
also WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 321 (citing a recent survey revealing that non-custodial

parents fail to comply with child support orders at a rate of sixty to eighty percent); Elrod,
supra note 48, at 128; Fineman, supra note 5, at 2211 n.74.
50. WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 262.
51. Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REv. 10, 22 (1994).
52. WEITZMAN, supra note 23, at 350.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 400.
55. For examples of family law decisionmaking by the United States Supreme Court, see
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (finding an action in tort by woman on behalf
of her children against their father and her former husband for child abuse was properly before
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substantial federal and model state legislation. 6 While some scholars argue in

favor of this increased federal involvement in family law decisionmaking,"
others maintain that state decisionmaking in the family law area more

appropriately reflects a community's perception of family life. 8 In at least one
area of family law, the establishment and enforcement of child support, "the
federal government has effectively usurped traditional state supremacy." 9 The
debate concerning the federalization of other family law issues is likely to
continue.

the federal court, but upholding the domestic relations exception excluding divorce, alimony,
and child custody decrees from federal court jurisdiction); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604 (1990) (affirming jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a divorce case when
service complied with due process requirements); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989) (upholding the constitutionality of an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy); Mansell
v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) (holding that state courts may not treat military retirement pay
waived by the retiree to receive veterans' disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding unconstitutional certain regulations relating to
inmate marriages); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding unconstitutional a racial
classification as a basis for child custody determination); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983), Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (determining the constitutionality of state statutes prescribing conditions precedent to
unwed fathers' receiving notice of adoption proceedings); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(holding unconstitutional a gender-based alimony statute); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (holding unconstitutional state restrictions on marriage based upon failure to satisfy
child support obligations); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding durational residency
requirements incident to divorce); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding
unconstitutional a statute presuming unwed fathers unfit to raise their children); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state restriction on interracial
marriage).
56. For examples of federal legislation in the family law area, see Safe Homes for Women
Act of 1984, § I10A, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (1994); Indian Child Welfare Act, § 21, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1994); Child Support Enforcement Act, §7, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-669 (West 1991 & Supp.
1996); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, § 67, 42 U.S.C. §
5101-5106h (1994)]; Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, § 110, 42 U.S.C. §§
10401-10418 (1994). For examples of model state legislation in the family law area, see UNIF.
ADOPTION ACT §§ 1-101 to 8-106, 9 U.L.A. 1 (1994); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
ACT §§ 1-28, 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968); UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT §§ 1-26, 9A U.L.A. 97
(1983); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 101-506, 9A U.L.A. 147 (1973).
57. See Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism,and the FederalCourts, 79 IOWA L.
REv. 1073, 1075 (1994) (advocating that federal courts exercise diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction over divorce, alimony, and child custody cases).
58. See Dailey, supra note 6, at 1790-91 (defending state sovereignty over family law based
on the premise that state legislatures and state courts reflect community values in fashioning
family laws and in rendering decisions in these cases); cf Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Domestic
RelationsLaw: FederalJurisdictionand State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1 (1984) (suggesting that family law cases raising issues beyond the domestic relations
exception may be appropriate for federal courts to entertain).
59. Elrod, supra note 48, at 103 (tracing the history of the federal government's
involvement in child support issues as a means to reduce the number of welfare recipients).
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C. The Need for an EcologicalApproach to Family Legal
Issues
Most family law scholars argue that the dominant trend in family law
adjudication and the underlying policy in family law legislation have resulted in
a greater recognition of individual rights and pragmatism in place of moral
relativism.' As a result of this focus on individualism, some suggest that the law
in this area should permit and encourage couples to negotiate, bargain, and
determine their own arrangements through private ordering or agreements' Given
the growing sophistication of family law practitioners and the increase in courtordered or court-supported mediation,62 it is likely that more individuals will

60. Michael Grossberg, Balancing Acts: Crisis, Change, and Continuity in American
Family Law, 1890-1990, 28 IND. L. REV. 273, 289 (1995); see also MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 6,

86 (1991); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520 (1994); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985). According to

Schneider, American family law has undergone two transformations, the first of which occurred
in the nineteenth century and "increasingly ordered relations between husband and wife, that
increasingly dealt with the termination of those relations, and that increasingly spoke to the
relations between parent and child and between the state and the child." Id. at 1805. The
second transformation occurred in the last 20 years and has been a "shift away from public
standards to private ordering," including "a fruitful area of generalization [about] the
relationship between morals and family law .... "Id. at 1805-06 (citations omitted). The author
suggests, however, that there has been a shift in control of moral decisionmaking from the law
to the people previously regulated by the law. Id. at 1819-20.
61. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The

Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-51 (1979). The authors point out the advantages of
private ordering, including financial savings by avoiding the costs of litigation, reduction of
emotional pain by avoiding an adversary proceeding, avoidance of the uncertainty of litigation,
reduction of delays in court hearings, and achievement of a resolution that is more acceptable
to both parties over time than one imposed by a court. Id at 956-57. The authors also "believe
divorcing parents should be given considerable freedom to decide custody matters-subject
only to the same minimum standards for protecting the child from neglect and abuse that the
state imposes on all families." Id. at 957 (emphasis in original). In fact, the authors propose that
"the primary function of the legal system should be to facilitate private ordering and dispute
resolution .... ." Id. at 986; see also J. Thomas Oldham, PremaritalContracts Are Now
Enforceable, Unless ... 2 21 Hous. L. REv. 757 (1984) (proposing a regulatory scheme to

determine the enforceability of marital and premarital contracts in an effort to streamline the
divorce process and to decrease court involvement).
62. While an analysis of mediation of domestic disputes is beyond the scope of this Article,
documentation of the growing practice of court-related mediation abounds. See, e.g., Jay
Folberg et al., Use ofADR in CaliforniaCourts:Findings& Proposals,26 U.S.F. L. REv. 343

(1992) (providing an extensive analysis of comprehensive survey data regarding attitudes
toward and practices that comprise alternative dispute resolution in California's civil courts,
as well as identification of problems and proposals); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on
JudicialADR and the Multi-DoorCourthouseat Twenty: FaitAccompli, FailedOverture, or
Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297 (1996) (arguing that courts must

incorporate more alternative dispute resolution, yet they must continue to adjudicate cases in
the traditional manner); Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker,A.B.A. J., Aug.
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resolve their disputes outside the courtroom. Nonetheless, the number and
complexity of adjudicated family law cases are likely to increase. 3 Even those
who advocate negotiated settlements acknowledge that some family law cases
may result in protracted litigation for a variety of reasons, including feelings of
spite on behalf of one or both parties, as well as a distaste for negotiation.'
Similarly, others doubt that abdicating family law decisionmaking to any other
professional group outside the adversary system can improve results.65 The
public nature of the adversary system involves explanation, debate, and
contemplated decisions, in contrast to a process such as mediation, where
decisions generally evolve without any formal consideration by the justice
system.66
The concept of privatization suggests a trend in all substantive family law
areas, as well as in procedural issues, toward private rather than state-imposed
decisionmaking.67 In the quest for family law jurisprudence that more
appropriately promotes families' well-being, the privatization of family law over
the last few decades may offer "a sort of transition strategy-a way of moving
from an outdated and unjust public law regime to a system whose publiclyimposed constraints more accurately reflect social reality and more fairly
distribute the benefits and burdens of family life. 68
Family law adjudication involves functions in addition to the social and private
dispute resolution functions. Historically, family law has helped shape our
conceptions of proper roles and values for interpersonal relationships. 69 Along
with the need for family law decisionmaking to promote families' well-being, the

1996, at 55 (assessing the incorporation of alternative dispute resolution techniques in
America's courts and discussing survey results revealing an even split on the desirability of
mandatory alternative dispute resolution programs, as well as a preference for mediation over
litigation and arbitration); see also Weinstein, supra note 38, at 246-47. But see Penelope E.
Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politicsof Power,40 BUFF. L. REv. 441

(1992) (arguing that spousal power disparities evident in divorce mediation reverse efforts of
divorce reform movements that have availed women of greater economic rights); Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (arguing that settlement is not
preferable to court judgments and should not be indiscriminately institutionalized or
encouraged); Trina Grillo, The MediationAlternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE

L.J. 1545, 1551 (1991) (expressing concern about the ability to derive quality agreements
through the process of mediation).
63. Melton, supra note 7, at 2045-46.
64. Mnookin &Kornhauser, supra note 61, at 974; see also Folberg et al., supranote 62,
at 347.
65. Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking,101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 729 (1988). But see Ann Milne,
Mediation-A PromisingAlternativefor Family Courts, 42 Juv. & FAM. CT. J., no. 2, 1991,

at 61, 72 (arguing that mediation is ideally suited to resolve complex conflicts between
individuals who have a continuing relationship with each other, family law litigants).
66. Fineman, supranote 65, at 770.
67. Jana B. Singer, The PrivatizationofFamily Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1444.

68. Id. at 1446.
69. Id. at 1559; see also Dailey, supra note 6, at 1861 (footnote omitted) (viewing family
law "as the product of a normative discourse among a community of citizens living in a
particular place at a particular time in history").
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task of family law jurisprudence to continue this tradition of imparting values
necessitates a "revitalization of family law." 7 This revitalization may require
substantial changes to the manner in which courts currently address family legal
issues, including restructuring the existing court system. Recent
recommendations have called for states to create unified family courts,7 ' and
some jurisdictions already have responded." While this effort represents a
significant improvement in how courts address family legal matters, a novel and
more expansive approach to the resolution of these issues in any context or court
setting can fundamentally reform family law decisionmaking. Irrespective of the
particular court structure or setting, family law decisionmakers must consider
factors beyond their. conceptions of the family and account for the "family
ecology." Examination of the neighborhoods, religious organizations, and other
associations or institutions within which family members participate can provide
this broader context for decisionmakers. These institutions represent mediating
structures that influence families and on which families must rely to perform
their nurturing and caregiving functions.74 In order to assist families by
promoting their well-being through family law decisionmaking, judges must
account for and attempt to strengthen various aspects of families' environments
or ecologies:
There is at present in legal discourse little recognition that family members
may need nurturing environments as much as they need rights, or that
families themselves may need surrounding communities in order to function
at their best. By systematically-though for the most part
unintentionally-ignoring the "little platoons" from which families and
individuals have always drawn emotional and material sustenance, modern
legal systems probably contribute to some extent to their atrophy.'

70. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of FamilyLaw, 69 TEX. L. REV.
245, 280 (1990) (reviewing GLENDON, supra note 13).
71. See A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN
AND THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION

54 (1993) (recommending the establishment of unified family courts in all states); see also
Mary Wechsler, Unified Family Courts, in 2 THE CONFERENCE CALL, Summer 1995, at 1
(reporting on a national conference of bar presidents, which group called for the creation of
unified family courts).
72. Since 1994, three state legislatures have authorized the creation of family courts within
the entire state or within selected areas of each state. See 1996 MD. LAwS 13; 1995 N.H. LAWS
152:2; VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie 1995).
73. GLENDON, supra note 13, at 308; see also Weinstein, supra note 38, at 248 ("The
courts' functioning must be put in a social context, as part of a web of institutions that enable
people to live together peaceabl[y]. We have learned to see legal institutions as part of a larger
ecology in which various dispute institutions interact and effect [sic] one another.").
74. See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 27, at 2-6. The authors argue that neighborhoods,
families, churches, and voluntary associations, among other institutions affecting an
individual's private life, must be empowered wherever possible in place of governmental
agencies to accomplish social goals, as opposed to defending the individual against these
institutions.
75. GLENDON, supra note 13, at 308.

1997]

FAMILY LA WJURISPRUDENCE

Knowledge gained from social sciences relevant to family issues can assist with
developing this expanded focus for decisionmakers.7 6 In addition, competence
in a variety of disciplines, particularly for those engaged in family law, is critical
for family law to achieve legal realism, or to become more reflective of and
responsive to social realities."
II. THE CASE FOR AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK IN
FAMILY LAW JURISPRUDENCE

The challenge for those charged with resolving family law issues in a
responsive manner becomes how to consider the institutions composing the
family ecology. Application of a theoretical research paradigm from the social
sciences, known as "the ecology of human development,""8 can facilitate
"functional integration"79 between social science and public policy.

76. See SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY
BREAKDOWN 146-47 (1971); see also Joan S. Meier, Notesfrom the Underground:Integrating
Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21
HOFsTRA L. REV. 1295, 1308-09 (1993) (footnote omitted); Melton & Wilcox, supra note 3,
at 1214; Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms: FeMinistPerspectiveson Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
191, 191 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). Joan Meier shows how, in the
domestic violence context, social science research has elucidated for legislative policy makers
the impact of spouse abuse on children living in a home where that domestic violence occurs.
"Numerous states and the United States Congress have in the last few years passed legislation
calling for state courts to consider evidence of spouse abuse in custody determinations, thereby
mandating a transformation in traditional judicial approaches to the issue." Meier, supra at
1309 (footnote omitted).
77. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, MadMidwifery: BringingTheory, Doctrine,andPractice
to Life, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1977, 1991 (1993). The author finds that this interdisciplinary
competence "cannot be dismissed as simply a professorial predilection for dabbling. To the
contrary, at least in family law, interdisciplinary studies are not a distraction from, but a critical
part of, modem lawyering. It would be futile to isolate legal doctrine and practice from
psychology, economics, sociology, religion, and history... ." Id.; see also Meier, supra note
76, at 1297 (suggesting that the subject of domestic violence encompasses the disciplines of
psychology, sociology, public policy, criminology, medicine, public health, and law); Sarah
H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis and
Formation: Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631, 632 (1994)
(acknowledging that "[s]ocial science research can make a valuable contribution to family law
analysis and formation. It can help define problems, identify possible solutions, and challenge
underlying normative assumptions").
78. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 21.
79. Id. at 8-9. Bronfenbrenner defines this functional integration as follows:
Knowledge and analysis of social policy are essential for progress in
developmental research because they alert the investigator to those aspects of the
environment, both immediate and more remote, that are most critical for the
cognitive, emotional, and social development of the person. Such knowledge and
analysis can lay bare ideological assumptions underlying, and sometimes
profoundly limiting, the formulation of research problems and designs and thus
the range of possible findings.
Id. at 8.
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A. An Explanation of the Ecology ofHuman Development
as a TheoreticalModel
In order to understand how and why family law jurisprudence can benefit by
application of a perspective that draws on the wealth of knowledge social
scientists can contribute to the resolution of family conflict, it is necessary to
understand exactly what that perspective is. This section outlines the relevant
theoretical underpinnings of Professor Urie Bronfenbrenner's ecology of human
development, one goal of which is to provide a comprehensive paradigm to study
how human development occurs. This social science model promotes an
understanding of the interaction among individuals, institutions, and the social
environment, thus helping to identify problems and to propose solutions." The
ecological perspective strives to strengthen these interactions and
interconnections in order to improve the world in which families and children
function. 8
Bronfenbrenner's overriding thesis is that "[t]he family is the most humane,
efficient and economical system for making human beings human known to
man." 2 Thus, for Bronfenbrenner, the interactions between a child and his family
are the main focus of human development. Bronfenbrenner studies how the
child's immediate interactions with family members, as well as the child's and
his family members' interactions within other settings of their lives, such as the
school and the workplace, influence the child's development. He suggests ways
to strengthen the child's and family members' development by pursuing
strategies designed to establish connections among all the competing influences
on children and families. The perspective assumes that the functioning of
children and families can be enhanced and, consequently, human development

80. GARY B. MELTON,

CHILD ADVOCACY: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES AND INTERVENTIONS

64

(1983); see also GARY B. MELTON

ET AL., COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE
COURTS: AN EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED FORENSIC SERVICES (1985). This book offers

a comprehensive examination of the relationship between the mental health professions and the
legal system, with suggestions for strengthening that relationship.
81. James Garbarino & Robert H. Abramowitz, SocioculturalRisk and Opportunity, in
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 35 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d ed.
1992). Application of an ecological perspective may present challenges:
It would be easy to cast aside the many interconnections and pretend that there is
just the developing child, orjust the family as a social unit, orjust the community
power structure, orjust the professional delivering human services. It would be
easy, but we believe it would not be enough. Rather, we seek to capture the whole
tangled mass*of relationships connecting child, family, and social environment.
James Garbarino & Mario T. Gaboury, An Introduction, in CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 1, 1 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992) (emphasis in original).
82. American Families: Trends and Pressures, 1973: Hearings on Examination of the
Influence that GovernmentalPolicies Have on American FamiliesBefore the Subcomm. on
Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd Cong., 134, 179

(1973) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Uric Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Human
Development and Family Studies and Psychology, College of Human Ecology, Comell

University).
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may be improved by strengthening the quality and quantity of relationships and
of interactions among systems.
The paradigm devised by Bronfenbrenner is unique in that it focuses on human
development outside the research laboratory and in situations regularly occurring
in the environment that present risks or opportunities to individuals, such as
within families, among friendship groups, within neighborhoods, at schools, and
within communities. 3 "It sees the social environment as a grand human
experiment, and thus invites our efforts to improve it, to make it better." 4
Bronfenbrenner arranges the situations or contexts within which individuals live
their lives on a scale from smallest to largest. He sees a person's experience "as
a set of nested structures, each inside the next, like a set of Russian dolls." 5 He
immediate context within which development occurs as the
labels the most
"microsystem, ' " comprised of the settings in which the individual experiences
daily reality, such as the parent-child relationship, the husband-wife relationship,
and the child-teacher relationship.
For Bronfenbrenner, the next level of interaction within which development
occurs is the "mesosystem," s or the relationships between those contexts or
microsystems in which a person experiences reality. For example, consideration
of the mesosystem involves determining the amount of interconnectedness
between a child's school and his home setting, or between a child's home and
church setting, or between a child's school and the neighborhood setting. "The
central principle here is that the stronger and more complementary the links
between settings, the more powerful the resulting mesosystem will be as an
influence on the child's development. A rich range of mesosystems is both a
product and a cause of development." 8
The next largest system affecting human development Bronfenbrenner labels
the "exosystem,"' 9 or those settings that have power over one's life, yet in which
one does not participate. For example, a parent's place of employment or peer
group has an influence on the child's life, even though the child is not directly
involved in those experiences."

83. Garbarino & Gaboury, supra note 81, at 4.
84.Id.at3.
85. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 3.
86. Id. at 7, 22.
87. Id. at 7-8, 25.
88. James Garbarino & Robert H. Abramowitz, The Ecology ofHuman Development, in
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES INTHE SOCIAL ENviRoNMENT 11, 26 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d
ed. 1992).
89. BRONFENBRENNER, supranote 10, at 7-8, 25.
90. See, e.g., Cahn, supranote 57, at 1113-14 (discussing the effect of family roles and
responsibilities on workplace participation, as well as how the workplace structures family
life); see also Fineman, supra note 5, at 2184 ("Altered expectations and aspirations about
equality and economic opportunity have been the impetus for many individual women to
change the ways they practice mothering. On a societal level, these changes have generated
reconsideration of the meaning and implications of motherhood."). An example of exosystem
effects exists in the following:
The effects of divorce, nonpayment of child support, foster-care, restrictions on
marriage, and numerous other aspects of family life on the national economy are
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Finally, "[m]eso- and exosystems are set within the broad ideological and
institutional patterns of a particular culture or subculture. These are the
macrosystems. Thus, macrosystems are the 'blueprints' for the ecology of human
development. These blueprints reflect a people's shared assumptions about 'how
things should be done."' 9 The macrosystem ideology or social policy creates
various risks and opportunities for the individual. In defining macrosystem risk
and opportunity, "macrosystem risk is any social pattern or societal event that
impoverishes the ability and willingness of adults to care for children and
children to learn from adults, while opportunity is the social pattern or event that
encourages and supports parents and children."92 An example of macrosystem
risk is a national economic policy that contributes to child and family poverty;
an example of macrosystem opportunity is a national policy that values families
by giving economic incentives for families with young children.93
Bronfenbrenner espouses a phenomenological approach, in that researchers
must examine the meanings that aspects of the environment have for the person
within a given context or setting and between or among those contexts.94 He also
recognizes that over the course of a lifetime, situations may change in their
effects on individuals and families, thereby imposing a life-course perspective
on the study of families and children.95
Nonetheless, "[t]he most important thing about this ecological perspective is
that it reveals connections that might otherwise go unnoticed and helps us look
beyond the immediate and the obvious to see where the most significant
influences lie." 96 Bronfenbrenner argues that these naturally-occurring
interactions or interconnections can be strengthened to enhance individual and

widely documented. Indeed, it is arguable that no institution has more direct links
to the economic, social and political well-being of this country than the family.
Dailey, supra note 6, at 1819 (footnote omitted).
91. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 88, at 27 (emphasis in original).
92.Id. at 28.
93. Id.
94. Garbarino & Gaboury, supra note 81, at 9-10; Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note
88, at 29-30.
95. Id. The following illustrates the need for a life-course perspective:
Since most data are a cross-sectional snapshot of families, families are assumed
to be static. A more realistic (though much more difficult) approach is to
recognize and analyze the fluidity, change, and transitions as individuals live in
a variety of family patterns. There are periods in the life cycle when an individual
family may be one in which the father works and the mother stays home with the
children. This stage is relatively short-lived when the total family life course is
analyzed. There are periods, also, when women (and men) find themselves raising
a family without.a spouse present, but again, for many this is a transition period.
None of these types or stages, however, should be viewed as the dominant or
"ideal" family type. No one family type is superior to another or to be favored
over others. Effective policies and services should be sensitive to the needs and
stresses of certain types of families and recognize that some families are at greater
risk (statistically) than others.
ROBERT M. MARONEY, FAMILIES, SOCIAL SERVICES, AND SOCIAL POLICY: THE ISSUE OF SHARED

RESPONSIBILITY 50 (1980).
96. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 88, at 19.
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family development? 7 He suggests that the crucial question becomes whether we
can change social institutions so that they can function as positive influences on
the lives of the families and children with whom they interact by increasing the
quantity and quality of individuals' and families' connections among the systems
of his paradigm.9" Also, since each level of functioning can produce either
positive or negative effects, either opportunities or risks, it is important to assess
the impact of each system on individuals and families:99
[The researcher's task is to determine] how the essential functions of the
parent [at each level of functioning] are supported, encouraged,
supplemented, and reviewed by people with a long-term investment in the
welfare and well-being of the child. A truly poor child is one whose parents
are left to their own devices, particularly when those devices are too limited
for the difficult task of rearing a child. A poor child is one who is
unprotected. A rich child is one whose life is full of diverse and enduring
relationships and whose parents are similarly involved in an interlocking web
of supportive, nurturant, and concerned relationships. The higher the personal
risk of the child, the greater the importance of sociocultural resources. The
principal task for the community is to know how socially well-fixed their
families are and to proceed accordingly. The community needs to recognize
positive forces where they exist naturally (and then leave them alone) and to
learn how to generate and sustain them where they do not exist already.'
The ecological perspective, then, is vitally concerned with the reciprocal and
functional relationship between social science and public policy.'0 '
In terms of fashioning responsive family law decisionmaking aimed at
"'creating a more human ecology,' ' 0 2 "the ecological perspective on human
development offers a kind of map for steering a course of study and
intervention."' ' This perspective leads to a recognition of family law

97. BRONFENBRENNER, supranote 10, at 214. But see Moncrieff Cochran et al., Personal
Networks and PublicPolicy, in EXTENDING FAMILIEs: THE SOCIAL NETWORKS OF PARENTS AND

THEIR CHILDREN 307, 310 (Moncrieff Cochran et al. eds., 1990) (mentioning that the policy
focus of most family support programs has involved the creation of "additions to the local
social ecology," or creating new programs such as domestic violence shelters and parenting
classes).
98. Hearings,supranote 82, at 157 (statement of Urie Bronfenbrenner).
99. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 88, at 28.
100. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supra note 81, at 65-66.
101. BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 10, at 130. "Public policy questions are relevant for
basic science primarily because they can alert the researcher to aspects of the immediate and,
especially, the more remote environment that affect developmental processes and outcomes."
Id As an example, Bronfenbrenner's own experiences as a researcher have determined a social
policy designed to enhance human development, in that he was a founder of Project Head Start:
[P]ublic policy has the power to affect the well-being and development of
human beings by determining the conditions of their lives. This realization led to
my heavy involvement during the past fifteen years in efforts to change, develop,
and implement policies in my own country that could influence the lives of
children and families.
Id. at xiii; see also Head Start Act § 105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9831-52(a) (1994).
102. Elizabeth M. Eddy, Book Review, 83 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 643 (1981) (reviewing
BRONFENBRENNER, supranote 10).
103. Garbarino & Abramowitz, supranote 88, at 28.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:775

jurisprudence as more than a mechanism for domestic dispute resolution.
Application of the ecology of human development paradigm to family law
decisionmaking can assist judges to identify the complex factors affecting
families' lives. Equipped with this expanded knowledge and consistent with
notions of the law's need to promote social welfare, family law decisionmakers
can use the law's power to more effectively intervene in families' and children's
lives. Adoption of this ecological framework thus compels the need for an
interdisciplinary approach to family law jurisprudence.
B. The Existing Relevance of Social Science

A willingness to cross scholarly boundaries and to engage in interdisciplinary
study or collaboration does not distract from the focus of family law; instead, it
enriches and clarifies that perspective. What is it that social science can offer the
field of law in general and family law in particular?
[S]ocial science is often the best source available for descriptive and
explanatory knowledge. It is undertaken systematically, with care for
methodological soundness and concern for objectivity. Social science tries
to build a cumulative understanding of the ways in which the world works.
Thus it provides both descriptive "facts" about a situation and understanding
of cause-effect linkages (i.e., the theories underlying policy action). As its
findings move into public
view, they tend to reshape the images we all hold
04
of the social world,

The complex and technical nature of our society prompts this need to utilize
several professions and disciplines." 5
Oliver Wendell Holmes argued in the late nineteenth century that a better
understanding of the social world must inform our knowledge of legal rules in
order to effectuate rational justice.'0 6 At that time, classical jurisprudence, or
adjudicating through a process of mechanical deductive logic and immutable law,
dominated the legal system.'0 7 Legal realists revolted against this notion of
opposition to change in the law,' consistent with their belief that law must
reflect social reality,'0 9 a jurisprudential philosophy that prevails today. Thus, a
reliance on social science" ° to provide that better understanding of the social
world advocated by Holmes is appropriate.

104. Carol H. Weiss, The Diffusion of Social Science Research to Policymakers: An
Overview, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 63, 72 (Gary

B. Melton ed., 1987).
105. Lynn M. Akre, Comment, Strugglingwith Indeterminacy: A CallforInterdisciplinary
Collaborationin Redefining the "Best Interest of the Child" Standard,75 MARQ. L. REV. 628,

629 (1992).
106. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
107. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
EstablishingSocial Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 479 (1986).

108. Id. at 482.
109. Melton & Wilcox, supra note 3, at 1214.
110. Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 479. Here, social science is defined as "the
application of empirical research methods to questions of human behavior." Id. at 479 n.4.
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The United States Supreme Court first relied on social science research at the
turn of the century,"' and the Court only began to rely with any frequency on
such evidence within the last forty years." 2 State courts, on the other hand, still
appear reluctant to rely on the use of social science data."3
A focus on the application of social science to the law recently has become
more visible." 4 Familiarity with social science can assist in honing lawyers'
insights and analyses." 5 Social science fosters the development of an "empirical
'frame of reference.""' 6 The application of social science to the law can range
from its relevance in the creation of a rule of law pursuant to the notion of social
authority, to the resolution of a specific case, or to the suggestion of a broadbased decisionmaking perspective or frame of reference, as espoused in this
Article.
A specific example of the relevance of interdisciplinary study to the field of
family law arises in the determination of child custody cases. A better
understanding of child development, including the various developmental needs

I11. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), as discussed in Monahan & Walker, supra note
107, at 477 & n.l.
112. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Gary B. Melton, The Impact of Social Science Research on
the Judiciary,in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 27, 54

(Gary B. Melton ed., 1987); see also Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 484. But see
Donald N. Bersoff& David J.Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court'sContinuing
Misuse of Social Science Research, 2 U. CHI.L. SCH.ROUNDTABLE 279 (1995) (discussing

cases where the Supreme Court has misused social science research or has refused to rely on
relevant social science data).
113. Hafemeister & Melton, supra note 112, at 54-55; see also Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption
by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J.

GENDER L. & POL'Y 207 (1995) (detailing how courts have considered social science research
to grant and to deny adoptions by gay and lesbian parents, as well as how opponents to these
adoptions often have misrepresented this social science data); Charlotte J. Patterson, Adoption
of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J.

GENDER L. & POL'Y 191 (1995) (concluding there is no evidence from social science research
to support arguments and court decisions that gay and lesbian parents' adopting children harms
the adoptees, rendering adoptive parents' sexual orientation an irrelevant consideration in
adoption proceedings).
114. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
at v (3d ed. 1994). The authors define their work as a "traditional law school casebook, albeit
on a non-traditional topic" that seeks to convince readers of the relevance of social science in
American law. Id A work summarizing papers and dialogues related to the Conference on the
Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts held in Washington, D.C. in
1978 describes the relationship between law and social science:
The papers and dialogues contained in this volume reflect the current state of
interchange between the applied social research community and the legal/judicial
community. That relationship is marked by mutual ignorance and
misunderstanding, but also by the promise of more and better utilization of social
research findings in the courts. Use of such findings in a legal context has
increased considerably in recent years and will almost certainly continue to do so.
Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron, Prefaceto THE UsE/NONUSE/MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL
RESEARCH IN THE COURTS at ix (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1978).
115. MONAHAN & WALKER, supranote 114, at v.
116. Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 488 n.40.
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and stages of children, may help decisionmakers reach more appropriate
outcomes in child custody cases. 1 7 This follows from the proposition that the
most appropriate source of child development information is the social science
expert."'8 In addition, the use of social scientific guidelines or findings regarding
child development can serve as the basis for factors judges should consider in
custody cases," 9 thereby limiting judges' discretion in these matters. In this
manner, social science research can contribute to the field of family law by
providing scientific alternatives to individualized judicial discretion. 2 '
Yet another area of family law appropriate for the introduction of social
science research is divorce. Because some judges misconstrue divorce as a onetime event rather than an ongoing process in the parties' lives, 2 ' social science
research can assist the court's decisionmaking by contributing studies
documenting the long-term psychological effects of divorce on the parties and
on their children. 2 These studies can guide judges to consider the many

117. Akre, supra note 105, at 628; see also Elovitz, supra note 113, at 207; Patterson, supra
note 113, at 191.
118. Akre, supranote 105, at 629.
119. Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal
Policymaking: Custody Determinationsat Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107; see also Elizabeth
Scott & Andre Derdeyn, RethinkingJoint Custody,45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455 (1984) (providing an

empirical examination of joint custody arrangements and proposing a legal rule to limit the
authority ofjudges to order joint custody to those cases wherein the parties voluntarily agree).
120. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 109.
121.

MACCOBY

& MNOOKIN, supra note 20, at 19. Maccoby and Mnookin discuss four

relationships that become transformed by divorce:
In the spousal divorce the intimacy-sexual, psychological, and social-between
husband and wife must be brought to an end. The economic divorce requires that
the previous economic relationship based on a single household be transformed.
The parentaldivorce requires the spouses to redefine their respective parental
roles because of the new arrangements required for the children. And the legal
divorce requires a process aimed at producing a written document specifying the
custodial and financial arrangements that will govern after the dissolution.
Though interconnected, these four aspects of divorce involve different processes,
and they may differ greatly in how difficult they are for a couple to manage.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Akre, supra note 105, at 638.
122. See E. Mavis Hetherington, Coping with Family Transitions: Winners, Losers, and

Survivors, 60 CHILD DEv. 1 (1989). The author found in a longitudinal study that individual
characteristics of children, interpersonal family dynamics, and factors external to the family
(such as a child's peer relationships) interact to affect any consequences to children resulting
from their parents' change in marital status. In addition, any negative consequences subside
within two to three years after divorce if there is not continued family stress. Id.; see also
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (exhaustive studies on the effects of divorce and

remarriage on children and parents); Carol S. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effects
of Ideology and Mediationon Child Custody Law and Children'sWell-Being in the United
States, 2 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 106, 117-18 (1988) (summarizing studies concerning the effects of
mediation of child custody proceedings on children's well-being); E. Mavis Hetherington &
Kathleen A. Camara, Families in Transition: The Process ofDissolutionand Reconstitution,
in 7 REv. CHILD DEv. RES. 398 (Ross D. Parke ed., 1984) (examining the effects of divorce and
subsequent transitions in family life on changes in the parent-child relationship and in the
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influences on the participants' adjustment to the divorce process, as well as how
that adjustment may affect other aspects of their lives, such as the academic
performance of their children." This knowledge allows judges to understand the
effects of their decisions on individuals' and families' lives.
Family law reform projects illustrate other applications of social science
research with a focus beyond assisting in the determination of an individual case.
Examples include the creation of child support guidelines, 24 analyses of the
effectiveness of wage withholding in increasing and collecting child support
awards, 25 identification of the concept of achieving timely permanent placements
for children in foster care, 26 and more general studies of the impact of foster care
27
on children.

While the advantages to applying social science research findings in family law
decisionmaking are many, justifications for a cautious approach to this

relationships between adults, as well as discussing resources available to assist families in
transition); Joan B. Kelly, CurrentResearch on Children'sPostdivorceAdjustment, 31 FAM.
& CONCILIATION CTs. REv. 29 (1993) (reviewing current research concerning the effects on

children of marital conflict, parental adjustment to divorce and separation, custody
arrangements, and parental access to children).
123. Akre, supra note 105, at 643; Hetherington, supra note 122; Hetherington & Camara,
supranote 122; see also SCOTT W. HENGGELER & CHARLES M. BORDUiN, FAMILY THERAPY
AND BEYOND at vii (1990) (discussing the contributions of family systems theory, which sees
behavior as a result of interactions among family members, to more effective approaches to
interventions in the family and arguing for a multi-systemic approach to such interventions);
Robert E. Emery & Michele Tuer, Parentingand the MaritalRelationship, in PARENTING: AN
ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 121, 123-25 (Tom Laster & Lynn Okagaki eds., 1993) (providing
a general explanation of family systems theory and family life cycle development). For an
example of an integrated systems approach to court reform, see William D. Mccoll, Comment,
Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court: Theory and Practicein an EmergingField,55 MD.

L. REV. 467, 502 (1996) (discussing the interactions of the legal, correctional, and medical
systems in the recently-created drug court).
124. Irwin Garfinkel & Marygold S. Melli, The Use ofNormative Standardsin Family Law
Decisions:Developing MathematicalStandardsfor ChildSupport, 24 FAM. L.Q. 157, 166-70

(1990).
125. See Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 632 n.l.
126. Herring, supra note 26, at 206-08 (arguing for a new approach to achieve timely
permanent placements for children in foster care based upon a political role of the American
family).
127. MICHAEL S. WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (1988);
Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Terminationof Parental
Rights of Children in FosterCare-An EmpiricalAnalysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121,

133-34 (1995) (finding that involuntary termination of parental rights has resulted in a rec6rd
number of children available for adoption but not yet adopted); see also L.J. v. Massinga, 838
F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming a preliminary injunction on behalf of present or former
foster children in the custody of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services to redress
deficiencies in the administration of the foster care program and finding that city and state
officials administering the program were not immune from damages for their actions or
inactions); Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to BiologicalParents:Their Effect
on TerminationofParentalRightsand Permanence,20 FAM. L.Q. 233, 246 (1986) (suggesting

that legal reforms designed to achieve permanency for children in foster care have not achieved
these goals and proposing strategies for attorneys involved in foster care cases).
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application exist. 128 One concern about the use of social science research is that
those attempting to apply the research may not have kept up with the literature
in the field and may not be as informed as possible regarding the social science
discipline. 29 Another fear is that users of social science research may
30
misinterpret the findings or may apply the information in the wrong context.1
In addition, judges and lawyers may give undue emphasis to social science
findings as a means to justify their arguments and conclusions in the difficult
area of family law decisionmaking.' 3 Finally, incorporating and applying social
science research may serve to mask a political or value-laden approach3 2to family
law decisionmaking and, instead, to treat it as a scientific approach.
Lawyers, judges, and policymakers who look to social science for assistance
in their work can address these inherent dangers. Primarily, it is incumbent upon
these users of social science research to thoroughly understand the particular
limitations and applications of any social science studies. 133 In addition, in the
same manner as family law decisionmaking reflects values and biases of
decisionmakers, users of social science findings must ascertain the particular
personal biases and values of the social science researcher.
When deciding whether to employ social science research, potential users of
such research must question whether the findings are ready for application in3 a
particular legal forum, a determination about which there are no strict rules.' 1
In evaluating the scientific strength and relevance of social science studies,
however, asking the following questions about the research offers useful
assistance: "How strong are the findings... ? How much disagreement exists in
the field? How appropriate is generalization from the laboratory to the specific

128. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 113; Akre, supra note 105, at 663-65; Fineman & Opie,
supranote 119, at 107-08; Statement of Sue Johnson, in THE UsENONusE/MISUSE OF APPLIED
SOCIAL RESEARCH INTHE CouRTs 40-41 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1978);
Gary B. Melton, Judicial Notice of "Facts" about Child Development, in REFORMING THE
LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 232, 239-40 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987).

129. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 108.
130. Id.; see Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 654-55.
13 1. See Melton, supra note 128, at 240 (suggesting that it may be difficult by any means
to educate judges about family life and child development).
132. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 110. In works particularly appropriate for the
education of professionals in the law, other scholars have suggested extensive frameworks for
assessing the validity, reliability, and overall methodological soundness of social science
research. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science andPolicy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1009-10 (1989); Ramsey &
Kelly, supranote 77, at 634.
133. See Faigman, supranote 132, at 1009, 1080-82.
134. Lois A. Weithom, ProfessionalResponsibility in the Disseminationof Psychological
Research in Legal Contexts, in REFORMING THE LAW: IMPACT OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH 253, 260-61 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987). But see Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm.,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), where the Court established criteria that scientific evidence must
meet for admissibility in federal court. A court must examine (1) whether the technique has
been empirically tested; (2) whether the technique has undergone peer review and publication;
(3) the error rate of the technique; and (4) the general acceptance of the technique among the
appropriate scientific community. Id. at 593-94. The test looks at the validity of research
techniques and the methodology. Id.
at 592-93.
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legal context in which the legal findings will be applied?"' 35 In addition, those
seeking to utilize social science research must weigh the potential benefits to

society against any harm resulting from application of the research.'36 Finally,
users of social science findings must evaluate the conceptual framework of the
study, the appropriateness of the methodology, alternative explanations for the
conclusions, and whether the conclusions are consistent with other research."'
One suggestion to combat some of the criticisms leveled at social science
methodology, including a purported failure of some social science studies to
account for important variables or factors that do not fit within a rational or
objective framework,' 38 is a suggestion that research be a "'collaborative'
endeavor."' 39 For example, in the law reform context, interdisciplinary
collaboration allows those interested in reform to review social science research,
either policy-oriented or theory-oriented, and to make decisions about the utility

of the research. 4 It permits those knowledgeable in family law to identify and
apply social science research relevant to documented legal problems. 4 '
Collaborative research and reform also assist social scientists, who can rely on
their legal colleagues to identify issues and frame questions for research.' 42
While the debate about the role of social science in the law is likely to
continue, attempts at cooperation and collaboration between the disciplines can
strengthen the bond.'43 This increased interaction can benefit both professions
by revealing linkages among the law, social science research, families, and
children.'4 4 Adopting the ecology of human development as a theoretical
framework for family law jurisprudence can inform and improve the
effectiveness of this collaborative effort, with an outcome of improved family
law decisionmaking.

135. Weithorn, supranote 134, at 260-61.
136. Id. at 261; see also Bersoff& Glass, supra note 112, at 293-301 (discussing cases
where the Supreme Court has refused to rely on relevant social science data or has relied on
irrelevant or misapplied findings); Elovitz, supra note 113, at 217-20 (discussing how courts
have considered social science research to grant and to deny adoptions by gay and lesbian
parents).
137. Ramsey & Kelly, supranote 77, at 669.
138. FINEMAN, supranote 60, at 115.
139. Fineman & Opie, supra note 119, at 129 (emphasis added).
140. Ramsey & Kelly, supranote 77, at 675.
141. Id. at 683.
142. Id.; see, e.g., GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (1987) (providing
an exhaustive summary and blueprint of the roles of mental health professionals and lawyers
in a wide variety of legal actions, including juvenile delinquency, child abuse and neglect, and
child custody in divorce); see also Statement of Charles H. Baron, in THE UsE/MsUSEINONUSE
OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE COURTS 154, 156 (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron
eds., 1978) ("Once social scientists become an intimate part of this adversary system, they will
be able to suggest changes in the system from a more informed point of view and with more
credibility ....).
143. Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 684.
144. Id.
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C. Adopting a Therapeutic Perspective
Family law adjudication by definition involves court intervention in the lives
of families and children. In contrast to social science, law "does not describe
how people do behave, but rather prescribes how they should behave."' 45 Thus,
the following questions become pertinent:
How deeply into the domestic realm can or should government go when
it intervenes in the lives of families and children? Conversely, what is
government's duty to families and children who are in legal and social
distress? These political and philosophical questions still bedevil public
officials in America today. Yet when society chooses
to intervene, it must be
46
done well and there must be accountability.
The notion of intervention implies an ability to influence the underlying
situation to make it more positive. 47 In family law adjudication, one function of
court intervention ought to aim to improve the participants' underlying behavior
or situation.' 48 Application of "therapeutic jurisprudence"149 to family law can
assist with this improvement effort. The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence
emerges from the field of mental health law, where it is defined as follows:
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a
therapeutic agent. It looks at the law as a social force that, like it or not, may
produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. Such consequences
may flow from substantive rules, legal procedures, or from the behavior of
legal actors (lawyers or judges).

145. Monahan & Walker, supra note 107, at 489 (footnote omitted).
146. Michael A. Town, The Unified Family Court: Therapeutic Justice for Families and
Children 1 (Mar. 11, 1994) (transcript available in Chicago Bar Association Building).
147. Irving E. Sigel, The Ethics ofIntervention, in CHANGING FAMILIEs 1, 8-9 (Irving E.
Sigel & Luis M. Laosa eds., 1983).
148. See Donald B. King, Accentuate the Positive-Eliminatethe Negative, 31 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 9 (1993); see also Judith T. Younger, Responsible Parentsand Good
Children, 14 L. & INEQ. J. 489, 501 (1996) (arguing that American families face an uncertain
future, such that "[t]he need to strengthen and stabilize them seems obvious and calls for a
change in legal perspective").
149. Wexler, supra note 11, at 8; see also David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceas a New Approach to Mental Health Law PolicyAnalysis and Research, 45 U.

MIAMI L. REv. 979, 989 (1991) ("The therapeutic jurisprudence perspective can provide a
useful lens through which to view an existing body of literature in order to discover new value
and applications."). A focus on the therapeutic aspects ofjurisprudence calls for an expanded
notion ofjurisprudence:
To speak of the therapeutic in ajurisprudential sense-to speak of it as a possible
form of public discourse in any sense-may seem strange to many, because at first
blush the very concept of the therapeutic would seem to be unremittingly private.
After all, therapy is, or once was, based upon the concept of a wholly private
space in which patient and therapist would explore, and perhaps remodulate,
aspects of personality.
Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lawyers: The Therapeuticas Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L.

REv. 1062, 1081 (1996) (footnote omitted).
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The task of therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify-and ultimately to
examine empirically-relationships between legal arrangements and
therapeutic outcomes. The research task is a cooperative and thoroughly
interdisciplinary one ....Such research should then usefully inform policy
determinations regarding law reform.'
The goal of therapeutic jurisprudence suggests a need to restructure the law and
the legal process by applying behavioral science knowledge to accomplish
therapeutic outcomes without interfering with traditional notions of justice.'
The potential exists to apply therapeutic jurisprudence to family law.' 52
In the family law context, this concept of the law as a therapeutic agent is
particularly relevant to situations where families experience intra- or inter-family
crisis. Envisioning the court's role in these family crisis situations as that of
facilitating more positive relationships or outcomes and of strengthening
families' functioning, or a "prescriptive focus,'. seems particularly appropriate.
Liberalized divorce laws'54 have encouraged a therapeutic focus by some
professionals involved in these cases, thereby providing an example of the
relevance of therapeutic jurisprudence to family law. As the legal focus in these
divorce cases has shifted away from questions of fault surrounding marital
breakup, the mental health profession's emphasis has centered on the effects of
divorce on family members.'55 In turn, these professionals have advocated

150. Wexler, supranote 11, at 8 (footnote omitted).
151. David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 279, 280 (1993). A focus on therapeutic jurisprudence may assist with law

reform efforts:
When there is a substantial literature available, this type of research.., basically
relates a body of relevant behavioral science to a body of law and explores the fit
between the two; in the process, certain legal schemes and arrangements may
stand out as comporting particularly well with therapeutic interests, and others
may seem less satisfactory from a therapeutic viewpoint. If the therapeuticallyappropriate legal arrangements are not normatively objectionable on other
grounds, those arrangements may point the way toward law reform.
David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, TherapeuticJurisprudenceas a New Research Tool, in
ESSAYS INTHERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 303 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991).

152. Wexler, supranote 151, at 281.
153. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. Sci. &L. 17, 21 (1993).

154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
155. The social work profession now has an expanded role relative to many family legal
proceedings:
As the number of families going through the legal process has increased, social
workers have become involved in an attempt to make the process less adversarial
so that family ties can continue. Counselors and therapists, who worked in roles
supportive of the adjudicative function, have become more central to the family
dissolution process.
Cahn, supranote 57, at 1091-92 (footnote omitted).
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therapeutic intervention in the legal aspects of divorce in an attempt to transform
the process to a more positive experience." 6
This therapeutic focus in divorce served as the basis for many states to create
conciliation courts with the advent of the liberalized divorce laws. These courts
provided separated or divorcing couples with marital counseling.'1 7 States
justified the creation of the courts by asserting their need to provide services to
families to ease the families' crises.' The role of the court system was
therapeutic in that the system attempted to assist families to adjust more
positively to the post-divorce context.'59 The therapeutic focus, however, stalled
in the 1960s due to an inability to reconcile the focus with the advocacy process
and to a concern about cost. 6
Family law jurisprudence can adopt and expand this service-oriented and
therapeutic focus. To accomplish this family law reform, a significant part of the
task becomes creating a jurisprudential model that assists judges to fashion
therapeutic interventions and outcomes for individuals and families.
To establish criteria designed to enhance the therapeutic nature of any reform,
family law reformers can look to proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence in the
field of mental health law. These reformers already have identified some of the
issues to promote in constructing a therapeutic jurisprudential paradigm. Some
of these issues include the ability of the reform to empower individuals by
allowing them to learn self-determining behavior and acquire decisionmaking
skills, as well as the ability of the reform to empower judges to exercise
sufficient controls to minimize abuse of the therapeutic measures.' 6' In the field
of family law, therapeutic justice should strive to protect families and children
from present and future harms, to reduce emotional turmoil, to promote family
harmony or preservation, and to provide individualized and efficient, effective
justice."'
Incorporating the notion of therapeutic jurisprudence, however, raises
questions about whether proponents of the therapeutic model are neutral, or
whether they have a bias toward procedures and results designed to ensure their

156. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 90; see also WErTZMAN, supranote 23, at 16-17 (discussing
the efforts in California in the early 1960s of Professors Henna Hill Kay and Aidan Gough to
restructure the divorce process to reduce hostility and to create a Family Court to "help couples
divorce with the least possible harm"). But see, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital
Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 519, 520 (1994)
(proposing that "[t]herapeutic divorce represented compelled nondivorce, holding families
together through 'directive' psychiatry").
157. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 151; see J. Herbie DiFonzo, Coercive Conciliation:Judge
Paul W. Alexander andthe Movement for TherapeuticDivorce, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 535 (1994)
(detailing the historical development of therapeutic divorce reform and early family courts and
suggesting why the effort stalled); DiFonzo, supra note 156, at 520 (tracing the origins of the
no-fault divorce movement and the history of conciliation courts as precursors to more recent
family courts).
158. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 151.
159. Id. at 152.
160. DiFonzo, supranote 157, at 575.
161. Wexler & Winick, supra note 151, at 309, 317.
162. Town, supra note 146, at 3, 21.
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continued involvement in the resolution process.' Applying therapeutic justice
to family law also invites concerns about whether judges and lawyers should
deviate from the traditional advocacy model of adjudication,"64 a system that can
further splinter already fragmented family relationships due to the adversarial
and protracted nature of many court proceedings. In resolving family law matters,
where the parties have some degree of relationship to one another and likely need
to continue their relationship to some extent, adjudication may not represent the
most appropriate dispute resolution technique. 6 On the other hand, recognizing
that adjudication is available as even a last resort can compel the parties in family
law proceedings to adopt less extreme positions and to negotiate or mediate as
dispute resolution techniques.16766 Mediation itself "in related-party cases can
prove a therapeutic process."'
The therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, or assessing the therapeutic impact
of adjudication, 168 offers a useful philosophy around which to structure family
law decisionmaking. Applying the notion of therapeutic jurisprudence does not
mean that the law serves predominantly therapeutic ends, nor does it suggest that
courts avoid other jurisprudential outcomes. An application of therapeutic
jurisprudence to family law means that decisionmakers need to evaluate the
therapeutic consequences of the application of substantive family law, as well as
the therapeutic effects of court rules, practices, and procedures. 169 This concern
about the therapeutic nature of family law decisionmaking, in combination with
the application of the ecology of human development paradigm, underlies the
interdisciplinary approach to family law jurisprudence proposed in this Article.
III. EXPANDING THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE

LAW: AN ECOLOGICAL AND THERAPEUTIC PARADIGM FOR
FAMILY LAW JURISPRUDENCE

"The American macrosystem has evolved into one in which the judiciary is the
arbitrator in most domains of family and community life."' 70 Thus, perhaps
unwittingly, family law decisionmakers, including judges and masters, play a

163. FINEMAN, supra note 60, at 164.
164. DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT

18 (1990).
165. Ralph Cavanagh & Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a
JurisprudenceofJudicial Competence, 14 L. & SOC'y REV. 371, 395 (1980). The authors
criticize adjudication as a proper method of fact-finding in "related-party" cases. Id. at 396.
166. Id. at 399, 400.
167. Id. at 401.
168. Wexler & Winick, supra note 149, at 981.
169. Id. at 1004.
170. James Garbarino et al., Social Policy,Children,and Their Families,in CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES INTHE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 271, 291 (James Garbarino et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992);
see also Weinstein, supra note 38, at 254 ("Increasingly, we depend on the secular legal system
to tell us how to live.").
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critical role in shaping social policy.' Because the law compels parties involved
in family legal matters to utilize the court system, the system has a corresponding
responsibility to resolve these issues in a helpful way. ' An approach to family
law jurisprudence that structures decisionmaking by applying the ecology of
human development paradigm, buttressed by notions of therapeutic
jurisprudence, provides a functional family law jurisprudential model. This type
of decisionmaking has the potential to facilitate problem-solving and to
positively enhance the quality of parties' daily lives, thereby rendering a more
effective outcome for individuals and families.'
The ecological perspective conceptualizes individual and family development
as a process that occurs as a result of the nurturance and feedback that
individuals receive on a daily basis from their interpersonal relationships.'74 To
be effective as a family law decisionmaking model, advocates, parties, and
human services providers'7 5 must identify for decisionmakers the types and
strengths of the microsystem relationships within which people function, or the
relationships between and among family members. In addition, decisionmakers
need to understand family members' mesosystem relationships, or relationships
between individuals and aspects of their immediate environment, such as
neighborhoods, schools, and religious organizations. For example, in a custody
proceeding, the judge needs to understand the degree of parental participation in
their children's schooling.
According to the ecological perspective, development also occurs both directly
and indirectly as a result of influences outside the family, or resulting from
macrosystem influences, such as the parents' employment setting.'76 As a

171. Garbarino et al., supranote 170, at 275-76 ("For our purposes, a policy is a statement
or a set of statements intended to guide decisions, activities, or efforts that generally describe
either desired (or undesired) outcomes and/or desired (or undesired) methods of achieving
them."); see also DONALD L. HOROwlTz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 56 (1977) (defining
social policy as "policy designed to affect the structure of social norms, social relations, or
social decisionmaking"); Opening Remarks of Clark C. Abt, in THE UsE/NoNusE/MISUSE OF
APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH INTHE COURTS I (Michael J. Saks & Charles H. Baron eds., 1978)
(arguing that judicial intervention in social policy has been increasing to encompass social
problem solving); MORONEY, supra note 12, at 2 ("[Slocial policy is concerned with a search
for and an articulation of social objectives and the means to achieve these.").
172. See King, supra note 148, at 9; see also Younger, supra note 148, at 501-02.
173. See HENGGELER & BORDUIN, supra note 123, at 28; see also Wexler & Winick, supra

note 149, at 984 ("If the therapeutically appropriate legal arrangements are not normatively
objectionable on other grounds, those arrangements may point the way toward law reform.")
(footnote omitted).
174. James Garbarino & S. Holly Stocking, The Social Context of Child Maltreatment,in
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING EFFECrIvE

SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAMILIES 1, 6 (James Garbarino & S. Holly Stocking eds., 1980).
175. See James Garbarino & Florence N. Long, Developmental Issues in the Human
Services, in CHILDREN AND FAMILIES INTHE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 231,232 (James Garbarino
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992) ("The term 'human services' encompasses a broad range of activities,
programs, and agencies designed to meet the physical, intellectual, and social-emotional needs
of individuals and families. These services are encountered primarily in microsystems... or
mesosystems (e.g., referral or liaison between agencies).").
176. Garbarino & Stocking, supra note 174, at 4.
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consequence, advocates themselves must understand and elucidate for
decisionmakers the effects of macrosystem influences on the family. In a custody
proceeding, for example, the judge needs to know time demands of parental
employment relative to time available for parents to engage in child-rearing
activities.
Utilizing an ecological approach to family law jurisprudence implies that
decisionmakers appreciate the importance of socially rich environments for
family members, including environments that provide support to families and
children through a mix of formal and informal relationships.' 77 In addition,
decisionmakers must recognize the interactions of individuals within a system
and between systems over time and across the course of a lifetime, as each
system participant continually adjusts to the other.'78 The responsibility of family
law decisionmakers to foster supportive environments for individuals and
families by adopting an ecological and therapeutic jurisprudential framework,
then, challenges decisionmakers to look beyond the individual litigants involved
in any family law matter, to holistically examine the larger social environments
in which the participants live, and to fashion legal remedies that strengthen a
family's supportive relationships. Decisionmakers must attempt to facilitate
linkages for the litigants between and among as many systems in their lives as
possible.
The adversarial nature of traditional methods of family law adjudication can
further fragment the relationship between family law litigants. A court system
that accommodates a range of dispute resolution techniques, including
negotiation, mediation, and adjudication, is important to ecological and
therapeutic family law jurisprudence. These methods enable judges to strike an
appropriate balance between the parties' own resolution of a family legal matter
by their private ordering or agreement and full court trial of family law issues.
Judges must have the ability to direct the parties to the most effective dispute
resolution techniques for their particular situation.' 79

177. Id. at3.
178. Id. at5.
179. Robert F. Peckham, A JudicialResponse to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery PlanningandAlternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253,
255, 256 (1985). "A judge's duty has never been purely adjudication. Judges have long
engaged in case and calendar management as well as court administration, mediation,
regulation of the bar, and other professional activities." Id. at 261; see also Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). Several justifications exist for the
increasing use of alternative dispute resolution techniques in family law:
Although thus far change exists more in the literature than in practice, the
appropriate role in family law for extra-judicial procedures such as mediation,
arbitration, and representation of both spouses by a single attorney is a subject of
great interest. Several factors account for this development. First, courts'
resources have been strained by a dramatic increase in the amount of family
litigation, and judicial time for the resolution of these disputes is seriously
inadequate. Second, the capacity of adversary proceedings (the litigational model
used in the United States) to handle these matters in a humane and effective
fashion continues to be seriously questioned. Finally, the financial costs of
litigation have become so burdensome that many people seek less costly
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To positively affect family members' behavior, thereby achieving a therapeutic
outcome, family law remedies must reflect an integrated approach to family legal
issues."' This means that decisionmakers must consider all of the parties' related
family legal proceedings,"' as well as all of the institutions or organizations
potentially affecting the behavior of families and children, including the
community, peer groups, educational institutions, and religious organizations.
Judges must know the neighborhoods of the families and children whose lives the
courts influence in order to conduct this mesosystem and exosystem analysis.'
This need for connection to the community also challenges the judiciary and the
courts to become leaders in the community and to "attempt to build procedures,
dispositions, and structures that foster extended-family and community
responsibility."''

alternatives.
Bruch, supra note 122, at 115 (footnote omitted). An examination of the form of state statutes
regarding custody mediation provides an example of how widespread the use of alternative
dispute resolution techniques in family law has become:
The majority of the [state] statutes [regarding custody mediation] are [sic]
discretionary in nature, allowing for mediation upon the recommendation of the
court or the request of one of the parties. Only eight states, including California,
require the mediation of all contested custody issues. Some states are still in the
process of implementing pilot programs in order to evaluate the effectiveness of
custody mediation prior to a full-scale commitment.
Dane A. Gaschen, Note, Mandatory Custody Mediation: The Debate over Its Usefulness
Continues, 10 OHIO ST.J. ON DisP. RESOL. 469, 472 (1995) (finding that approximately 60%

of the states have some form of custody mediation statute). On the other hand, judges must
understand the social science research documenting the coercive and anti-therapeutic nature
of alternative dispute resolution techniques in some circumstances, such as actions involving
victims of domestic violence and their abusers. Cf Grillo, supra note 62, at 1584-85
(discussing the role of mediation in situations involving victims of domestic violence).
180. Melton, supra note 7, at 2003. The conclusion that judges in family legal proceedings
already affect participants' behavior seems inescapable:
Because judges presumably are affecting therapeutic and rehabilitative
consequences anyway, a therapeutic jurisprudence approach would suggest that,
while they remain fully cognizant of their obligation to dispense justice according
to principles of due process of law, judges should indeed try to become less lousy
in their inescapable role as social worker.
Wexler, supra note 151, at 299.
181. RuBiN & FLANGO, supra note 45, at 3.
182. Melton, supra note 7, at 2004, 2044 n.272 (discussing the need for citizen advisory
groups to provide input to the courts).
183. Id. at 2004; see also Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private
Responsibilityand the PublicInterest,in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 166 (Stephen

D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). Some fear, however, that courts may become too
much like human services agencies if they attempt to perform these functions:
Retooling the judicial process to cope with the new responsibilities of the courts
means enhancing their capacity to function more systematically in terms of
general categories that transcend individual cases. Some such innovations are
required. And yet, it would seem, there is a limit to the changes of this kind that
courts can absorb and still remain courts .... The danger is that courts, in

developing a capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may become
altogether too much like them.
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In an effort to establish and nurture linkages between and among the
microsystems, mesosystems, and exosystems within which family members
participate, family law advocates, decisionmakers, and services providers must
coordinate their efforts to assist individuals and families. This need for
collaboration may result in shifting to social services" 4 agencies external or
adjunct to the court system some of the court's functions."'5 In the process of
attempts at timely agency intervention to resolve families' problems, however,

"[p]eople should not have to go to court to get help."' 86 Society as a whole must

begin to acknowledge that this type of intervention and support is therapeutic for
families, rather than viewing the intervention as an indication that families have
failed." 7 The fact that service agencies in our society generally are very highly
specialized, with little integration among the various service agencies and with
an emphasis on treatment of problems rather than on problem prevention,' 8
complicates this facet of an ecological and therapeutic approach to family law

HOROWITZ,supranote 171, at 298.
184. See MORONEY, supra note 12, at 13 (defining social services "as those services
designed to aid individuals and groups to meet their basic needs, to enhance social functioning,
to develop their potential, and to promote general well-being") (footnote omitted).
185. Melton, supra note 7, at 2001; see also Resnik, supra note 179, at 438-40 (discussing
the issues of alternative dispute centers and agency adjudication). Many barriers exist to
attempts by courts and agencies to coordinate efforts to serve families:
Agencies and organizations often jealously guard their organizational turf and
may be reluctant to relinquish some of the control they have over clients in
traditional one-to-one relationships. Practitioners may be unwilling to share their
functions with non-professionals. They may see central figures in personal social
networks as incapable of dispensing help to needy families. New approaches that
work to strengthen personal social networks may appear to be luxuries that most
agencies cannot afford. What is more, efforts to promote and strengthen personal
social networks raise the issues of confidentiality, autonomy, and privacy.
Garbarino & Stocking, supra note 174, at 11.
186. Melton, supranote 7, at 2047.
187. Americans tend to believe that reliance on social services or reliance on others for
assistance constitutes an admission of failure:
It is apparent that all families make use of (and many more are in need of)
some form of outside help in raising their children, yet we still maintain a myth
of self-sufficiency. Since in reality we are dependent on each other, it makes little
sense to perpetuate the myth that we are not. Valuing independence stigmatizes
those individuals who use family services as well as those individuals who
provide them. A new concept of the way in which families (and individuals)
should interact with each other and the other elements of society is imperative.
Why not acknowledge the interdependence that already exists? Why not see it as
positive?
James Garbarino et al., Who Owns the Children?An Ecological Perspectiveon Public Policy
Affecting Children, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD & YorTH SERVICES 43, 46-47 (Gary

B. Melton ed., 1982) (footnote omitted).
188. Anne Marie Tietjen, IntegratingFormaland Informal Support Systems: The Swedish
Experience, in PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DEVELOPING AND
MAINTAINING EFFECTIVE SUPPORT SYSTEMS FOR FAMILIES 15, 17 (James Garbarino & S. Holly
Stocking eds., 1980).
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decisionmaking.8 9 On the other hand, the need for collaboration with other
agencies does not mean that courts must relinquish their role as "the 'last resort'
arbiter"' of fundamental legal questions. To the contrary, courts must insist on
maintaining this function, as this belongs uniquely to the adjudicative process.' 9'
An ecological and therapeutic approach to family law jurisprudence, however,
does modify longstanding notions of adjudication.
Advocates and parties to disputes generally perceive adjudication as focused.
They ask the judge to determine whether one party has a right or duty, rather than

189. See Edward F. Hennessey, The Family, the Courts, and MentalHealth Professionals,

44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1223, 1224 (1989) (advocating the need for therapeutic services due
to the traumatic nature of many divorce and custody matters, as well as the importance of the

fundamental familial rights courts must address in these cases); see also Peter Salem et al.,
Parent Education as a Distinct Field of Practice: The Agenda for the Future, 34 FAM. &

CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 9 (1996) (examining issues of professional responsibility,
accountability, standards, and procedures for the proliferation of parent education programs
developed to help families deal with the difficult impact of separation and divorce, as well as
the need for these programs to be court connected). "Most parent education programs are court
connected in the sense that much of their support and referrals come from judges who hear
cases arising out of separation and divorce. The legal system needs assistance in enabling
parents to help their children." Id. at 18.
For examples of existing educational programs designed specifically to assist participants
in family legal proceedings, see Larry Lehner, Educationfor ParentsDivorcing in California,
32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 50 (1994) (describing a variety of court-connected
educational programs for family law litigants in California); Virginia Petersen & Susan B.
Steinman, Helping ChildrenSucceedAfter Divorce: A Court-MandatedEducation Program
forDivorcing Parents,32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 27 (1994) (discussing a mandatory
parent education program in Ohio for divorcing couples with children, the goals of which
include providing parents information about how to help their children with the divorce
process, about divorce-specific resources and services, about options for problem solving, and
about how to remain independent of the court); Carol Roeder-Esser, Familiesin Transition:
A Divorce Workshop, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 40 (1994) (describing a courtconnected mandatory divorce orientation program in Kansas that focuses on the psychological,
social, legal, and child-related effects of divorce, as well as enumerating optional educational
programs on other topics, including step parenting, grandparents' visitation, and single
parenting); Andrew Schepard, War andP.E.A.C.E.: A PreliminaryReport anda Model Statute
on an InterdisciplinaryEducationalProgramfor Divorcingand SeparatingParents,27 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 131 (1993) (describing a court connected interdisciplinary parent education
program in New York for parents involved in custody, child support, and divorce and
separation, and detailing the cooperation among the courts, mental health professionals, and
educators); Bill Miller, Divorce's Hard Lessons: Court-Ordered Classes Focus on the
Children, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1994, at Al, A12 (describing parent education programs in
Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, D.C.).
For a discussion of court-based mediation programs, see Milne, supranote 65, at 68-69. See
also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH, MEDIATION INVOLVING JUVENILES: ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND

POLICY QUESTIONS 45 (1991) (discussing the use of mediation in disputes wherein one of the
parties is ajuvenile).
190. Melton, supranote 7, at 2045.
191. See HOROWITZ, supra note 171, at 298 ("The danger is that courts, in developing a
capacity to improve on the work of other institutions, may become altogether too much like
them.").
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' Adjudication of family
request the judge to devise alternatives for the parties. 92
legal proceedings in an ecological and therapeutic jurisprudential model,
however, compels a judge to consider alternatives. The judge must attempt to
establish as many linkages as possible between and among various systems
within which family members participate.
In contrast to the resolution of disputes in a piecemeal process, where the
judge's power to decide extends only to the issues presented, 93 application of the
interdisciplinary family law jurisprudential model encourages judges to consider
all of a family's legal proceedings and related issues. This type of problem
identification enables judges to develop a holistic assessment of the family's
legal and social needs and to devise more comprehensive legal remedies.
Traditionally, judges conduct fact-finding at some distance from the social
settings of the cases they decide.' 94 This isolation can render judges' fact-finding
misguided and uninformed. Pursuant to an ecological and therapeutic
jurisprudential paradigm, judges' involvement with the community and its
organizations enables the judges to understand the contextual basis for their factfinding. This contextualized fact-finding allows judges to more realistically and
effectively address litigants' needs.
Finally, traditional notions of adjudication make no provisions for policy
review, as judges base their decisions on precedent and behavior that predates the
litigation.'95 Acknowledging that judges' decisions in family legal proceedings
constitute family intervention, the remedies judges fashion in an interdisciplinary
jurisprudential paradigm need to reflect policies that support families.
Application of both the ecology of human development perspective and notions
of therapeutic justice to the resolution of family legal proceedings provides a
jurisprudential paradigm for family law decisionmaking that empowers the court.
This jurisprudential framework offers a means for courts to approach family
problems in a systematic manner and to more effectively resolve the many and
complex family legal matters they face.
The distinctiveness of the judicial process-its expenditure of social
resources on individual complaints, one at a time-is what unfits the courts
for much of the important work .... Retooling the judicial process to cope
with the new responsibilities of the courts means enhancing their capacity to
that transcend
function more systematically in terms of general categories
96
individual cases. Some... innovations are required.
An interdisciplinary jurisprudential approach can refit the courts now, as well as
adequately prepare the courts to effectively address the novel and complex family
legal challenges of the future.

192. Id. at34.
193. Id. at35.
194. Id at 45.
195. Id. at 51.
196. Id at 298.
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CONCLUSION

This Article has proposed an interdisciplinary jurisprudential paradigm that
provides a common analytic framework for the resolution of all family legal
proceedings. The paradigm assists family law decisionmakers to account for the
diversity among individuals, legal issues, social issues, and other related matters
that constitute the cases before them and that create the plurality and richness of
American society. The paradigm can operate within any decisionmaking structure
or system for resolving family legal matters. As such, the ecological and
therapeutic jurisprudential paradigm can enjoy broad and universal application.
Because parties seeking resolution of family legal matters entrust judges to
make critical decisions affecting individuals' and families' daily lives, judges in
these cases must be more than triers of fact. Family law decisionmakers must
embrace as a goal of family law jurisprudence the need to strengthen individuals
and families and to enhance their functioning. This objective challenges
decisionmakers to examine the family holistically, identifying how family
members interact with other aspects of the family ecology at the present time and
over the course of time. Judges must know and understand the backgrounds and
communities from which family law litigants and their legal issues emerge.
A novel and expanded role for social science in the law can assist with this
task. Applying the ecology of human development paradigm to structure family
law decisionmaking allows judges to identify the systems within which
individuals and families function, as well as the organizations and human
services agencies that can assist families in a therapeutic manner. In fashioning
their legal remedies, judges must establish linkages between individuals and the
various systems within which they operate. These remedies can strengthen
families' functioning by providing families with necessary support.
This Article has attempted to respond to calls for a change in legal perspective
in family law decisionmaking,' 97 as well as challenges to "enhance cooperation
between lawyers and social scientists concerned with family law and public
policy."' 98 Social science has contributed to the law in diverse ways since the
beginning of this century. As society prepares to move into the next century,
application of this interdisciplinary paradigm to resolve family legal proceedings
represents an appropriate evolution in the collaboration between law and the
19 9
social sciences. While the American family may face an uncertain future,
history assures us that some form of the family is certain to endure. An
interdisciplinary paradigm for family law jurisprudence that applies the ecology
of human development perspective and notions of therapeutic justice can ensure
that family law decisionmakers and the courts are a source of strength and
support for the continued and enhanced functioning of American families.

197. Younger, supra note 148, at 501.
198. Ramsey & Kelly, supra note 77, at 685.
199. Younger, supra note 148, at 501 (footnote omitted).

